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No Penetration-and It's Still Rape
Lundy Langston*
No woman should be against men, but every woman should be for women.'
INTRODUCTION
Rape is a crime of violence; it is not sex. In 1995, an estimated 260,000
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. J.D., North
Carolina Central University School of Law, 1989; LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1991.
The author wishes to thank research assistants Orville McKenzie and Taylor Thunderhawk Whitney for
their invaluable research and editing skills and their extremely helpful comments, questions, and
suggestions through the many drafts of the Article.
1. JOHNNETTA B. COLE, DREAM THE BOLDEST DREAMS AND OTHER LESSONS OF LIFE 17 (1997).
2. But see CATHARINE A. MAcKtNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172-78
(1989).
Considering rape as violence not sex evades... the issue of who controls women's sexuality
and the dominance/submission dynamic that has defined it. When sex is violent, women may
have lost control over what is done to them, but absence of force does not ensure the presence
of that control. Nor, under conditions of male dominance, does the presence of force make an
interaction nonsexual. If sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less
whether there was force than whether consent is a meaningful concept.
Id. at 178. Furthermore, MacKinnon asserts that it is futile to seek to define rape as violence and not
sex:
The point of defining rape as "violence not sex" has been to claim an ungendered and
nonsexual ground for affirming sex (heterosexuality) while rejecting violence (rape). The
problem remains what it has always been: telling the difference. The convergence of sexuality
with violence, long used at law to deny the reality of women's violation, is recognized by rape
survivors with a difference: where the legal system has seen the intercourse in rape, victims
see the rape in intercourse. The uncoerced context for sexual expression becomes as elusive
as the physical acts come to feel indistinguishable. Instead of asking what is the violation of
rape, their experience suggests that the more relevant question is, what is the nonviolation of
intercourse? To know what is wrong with rape, know what is right about sex.... Perhaps the
wrong of rape has proved so difficult to define because the unquestionable starting point has
been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for women it is difficult to
distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance.
Id. at 173-74.
individuals were raped.' Of that number, an estimated 237,000 were female.4
Approximately two-thirds of rapes occurred at night, and most occurred at the
victim's home.5 Central city residents were the most likely to be raped.6 Women
in low-income groups were more likely to be raped; most rape victims tried to
protect themselves; and when rape victims knew their offenders, they were more
likely to be injured than victims of strangers.7
At common law, rape was defined as the unlawful carnal knowledge of a
woman, without her consent.' Carnal knowledge was defined as sexual inter-
course. Sexual intercourse implied genital copulation. Genital copulation, in turn,
connoted the act of sexual intercourse. Unlawful carnal knowledge required sexual
penetration, however slight.9 Today, in addition to the requirement of carnal
knowledge, most rape statutes require force or threat of force against the will and
without the consent of the victim.' ° Many people in the criminal law field,
3. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ-
163392, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 1-6
(1997).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 3.
6. See id. at 2-3.
7. See id. at 1-6.
8. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1769) (stating
that rape is "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will"); see also People v.
Cieslak, 149 N.E. 815, 816 (Il. 1925) (noting that ."[r]ape' is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly
and against her will"); Adams v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W. 151, 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (noting that
rape is the "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent"). For the crime of rape, it was
necessary to prove that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim. See State v. Clark, 544
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Kan. 1976) ("Rape is an act of sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman
not his wife without her consent and when the woman's resistance has been overcome by force or
fear."); Adams, 294 S.W. at 152; Commonwealth v. McCan, 178 N.E. 633, 634 (Mass. 1931) ("Rape
is the carnal knowledge of any woman above the age of consent against her will; ... its essence is the
felonious and violent penetration of the person of the female .... ); State v. Johnson, 289 S.W. 847,
851 (Mo. 1926) ("Before you can find.., rape, you must believe and find from the evidence that the
defendant forcibly assaulted and had sexual intercourse with the [victim] ... against her will.... You
cannot find that there was such sexual intercourse, unless you believe from the evidence that the
defendant penetrated the private parts of the body of the [victim] with his private parts to some
extent."); Starr v. State, 237 N.W. 96, 97 (Wis. 1931) ("'Rape' consists in accomplishing the act of
sexual intercourse by force and against the will of the female assaulted.... [T]he tearing of the vagina
to the extent that it was torn [was sufficient to show intercourse].").
9. See, e.g., State v. Machunsky, 274 A.2d 513, 515 (Vt. 1971) ("Penetration is necessary,
according to all authorities, to prove the crime of rape .... penetration of her sexual organ by that of
the male.").
10. See Cieslak, 149 N.E. at 816 ("'Rape' is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against
her will .... coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person of another.");
Johnson, 289 S.W. at 851 (stating a requirement of "the utmost resistance of which she was capable
to prevent"); Starr, 237 N.W. at 97 (stating that the crime of rape requires force and against the will of
the woman); Goldberg v. Maryland, 395 A.2d 1213, 1218-19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) ("[Alctual
physical force is not an indispensable element of the crime of rape .... [T]he presence or absence of
[resistance] ... must depend on the facts and circumstances in each case. But the real test ... in all
cases, is whether the assault was committed without the consent and against the will of the prosecuting
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particularly authors who have written on the subject of rape law, have asserted that
meeting an attacker with force was a male response and that this requirement
placed women in the position of being severely injured or killed." In particular,
numerous feminists responded to legislators by stating that women are not
socialized to meet an attacker with an attack, whereas men are socialized to
respond to an attack with force. Men will likely respond to an attack by a woman
with extreme rage, usually resulting in very serious injuries or death to the
woman." Thus, an attack response, in essence, is a male response.
Numerous law review articles have been written on the requirements of force
and against the will of the victim.' 3 The articles focus on the force requirement and
not the penetration requirement, which is the male understanding of what is
necessary when a woman is threatened with the crime of rape.
Even though there are numerous articles stating the force and against the will
requirements are male responses to being attacked, the male question has not been
addressed with respect to penetration. Penetration is required in addition to the
force and against the will requirements.' 4 Penetration, too, is a male understood
type conduct.' 5 The penetration of requirement does not necessarily require that
the vagina is completely entered or that the hymen is ruptured. Is entering the
witness.").
11. Although the focus of this Article is on female rape victims, the author recognizes that males
are also rape victims.
12. See GREENFIELD, supra note 3, at 9 (noting the disparity between numbers of male and female
sex offenders).
13. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1126, 1131 (1986).
[T]he law puts a special burden on the rape victim to prove through her actions her
nonconsent ... while imposing no similar burden on the victim of trespass, battery, or
robbery ....
[.. IF]or many courts, saying "no"-passive resistance-does not count as resistance....
The consent standard, like the force standard, thus emerges as another means to protect men
against unfair convictions by giving them full and fair warning that their (forceful) advances
constitute an unwelcome rape rather than a welcome, or at least accepted, seduction.
Id.
14. See MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 172-78. "Penetration is necessary, according to all
authorities, to prove the crime of rape, and such fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
Machunsky, 274 A.2d at 515.
15. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 Signs, J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND Soc'y 635, 647 (1983) (defining rape in male
genital terms by requiring sexual penetration).
vulva 16 or labia 7 sufficient?
Penetration, at common law, was defined as the penetration of the sexual
organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male. What is the female sex organ:
the vagina, the vulva, the labia? What is the male sex organ: the penis? The
requirement of penetration by "some male organ type mechanism" removed other
types of conduct with the vulva from the crime of rape.'" The penetration of the
vulva by the male sex organ is not regarded as rape by most jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions legislated penetration of the vulva, but required a showing of
penetration of the vagina.
The maleness requirement of force and penetration may be linked to the
historical male concepts of property.' 9 At early common law when rape statutes
were initially written, women were deemed property of men. 20 Virgin daughters
were a valuable commodity belonging to their fathers; wives were the chattel of
their husbands. 21 The father or husband ownership right of women made rape a
crime against property.22 Because rape was a property offense, the father or
husband was the victim rather than the woman. Because fathers or husbands were
the victims of rape, men wrote rape laws for their own benefit and therefore,
included a penetration requirement. Penetration requires male type conduct and
therefore, evolved as the measuring rod for determining when conduct had gone
far enough to constitute a crime. One commentator has stated the following:
[C]riminal law that reflects male views and male standards imposes its judgment on
men who have injured other men. It is'"boys' rules" applied to a boys' fight. In
rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women, and male
standards are used not only to judge men, but also to judge the conduct of women
victims. Moreover, because the crime involves sex itself, the law of rape inevitably
treads on the explosive ground of sex roles, of male aggression and female passivity,
of our understandings of sexuality-areas where differences between a male and a
female perspective may be most pronounced.
23
16. The vulva is "the external female genitalia including the labia majora, labia minora, clitoris, and
vestibule of the vagina." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1438
(1970).
17. The labia is the folds of tissue surrounding the vulva. See id. at 731.
18. This would exclude cunnilingus which is defined as an act of sex committed with the mouth
and the female sexual organ. See id.
19. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975).
20. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1127. Furthermore, "[i]n matters of sex, the common law
tradition views women ambivalently at best: Even when not intentionally dishonest, they simply cannot
be trusted to know what they want or to mean what they say." Id. at 1122.
21. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 18.
22. See Alexandra Wald, What's Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of Rape, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 459, 470 (1997) ("Women during the eighteenth century did not own their bodies;
instead, rights in sexual access to a wife or unmarried daughter were the property respectively, of a
husband or father.").
23. Estrich, supra note 13, at 1091.
[Vol. 26: 1, 19981 No Penetration-and It's Still Rape
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In addition to law review articles discussing the force requirement, numerous
articles have challenged the marital immunity rule. Because men deemed women
as property, rape laws originated as a way of protecting men's chattel.24 There are
also numerous religious references to those rights of men. The Torah states the
following:
In the case of a virgin who is engaged to a man-if a man comes upon her in
town and lies with her, you shall take the two of them out to the gate... and stone
them to death: the [woman] because she did not cry for help in the town, and the
man because he violated his neighbor's wife.... But if the man comes upon the
engaged [woman] in the open country, and the man lies with her by force, only the
man who lay with her shall die, but you shall do nothing to the [woman]. The
[woman] did not incur the death penalty, for this case is like that of a man attacking
another and murdering him. He came upon her in the open; though the engaged
[woman] cried for help, there was no one to save her.
If a man comes upon a virgin who is not engaged and he seizes her and lies
with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay with her shall pay the [woman's]
father fifty [shekels of] silver, and she shall be his wife. Because he has violated her,
he can never have the right to divorce her. 5
Moreover, The Holy Bible asserts the following:
If a man find[s] a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold
on her, and lie with her, and they be found; Then the man that lay with her shall give
unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife; because he
hath humbled her, he may not put her away all his days. 6
Furthermore, The Holy Quran states, "Woman was made to be (1) a mate or
companion for man; (2) except for sex, of the same nature as man .... " 27 Today,
states have either abolished the immunity or modified it to cover situations where
the parties are living apart. 28 Carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse had to be
24. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 16-30.
25. THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY V, DEUTERONOMY 22:23-29 (1983).
26. Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (King James).
27. THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QURAN 16:72, n.2103 (1989).
28. See Michael J. Gohring, Comment, Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 120, 133-35
(1981). Unlawful carnal knowledge had to be by a man who was not the woman's husband. See id.
at 121. Lord Hale explained the view that husbands could not rape their wives when he stated the
following: "[Bly their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind to her husband, which she cannot retract." See id. (citations omitted).
unlawful, and courts interpreted marital intercourse, in whatever form, as lawful.2 9
With modifications of the rape statutes, there are some protections for wives today.
For example, wives who separate from their husbands are protected by rape
statutes.3°
After the onslaught of feminist jurisprudence, numerous articles were written
concerning the "maleness" requirement for the female in order for there to be a
charge of rape. 3' Force against her will and consent requirements have been
interpreted to require "a male response" to the threatening behavior experienced by
female rape victims.3 2 Even though feminists have consistently raised the issue of
29. See id. at 133-37; see also State v. Bell, 560 P.2d 925, 931-33 (N.M. 1977) (stating that an
individual causing another to have unlawful sexual intercourse must be an individual other than the
spouse of the accused).
30. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (1997). The New York "marital exemption" provision was held
to violate equal protection. See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984); see also Warren
v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. 1985) (noting that there is no marital exemption under Georgia's
rape statute).
31. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1092-93.
At one end of the spectrum is the "real" rape, what I will call the traditional rape: A stranger
puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats her, and then engages in
intercourse.... But most cases deviate in one or many respects from this clear picture, making
interpretation far more complex. Where less force is used or no other physical injury is
inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting is
not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnaping but a date ....
Id. at 1092; see also Susan Ager, The Incident, DET. FREE PRESS MAG., Mar. 22, 1992, at 17.
We were alone beneath the stars, high in the mountains, miles from the nearest light, our
sleeping bags unrolled on the ground, weary from a long drive and anticipating sleep. Or so
I thought. We were not lovers, merely acquaintances. We worked together. We respected each
other. He owned a few acres in the mountains, and I admired that back-to-the-land streak in
anyone. So we agreed to make this weekend camping trip together to his patch of earth. A
few days earlier, oh so briefly, I thought about saying something. Issuing a "don't get any
ideas" warning. But I didn't. I thought he'd feel insulted. He did not worry so much about
my feelings. For hours on that starlit night he pestered me. Stroked me. Whispered to me
first, then argued, then whined: "Oh come on. You'll love it. Why'd you come up here with
me then? Just once. It's such a beautiful night. You'll enjoy it, really. Come on. Please?"
I didn't scream, because there was no one to hear. I didn't fight, because there was nowhere
to run. It was his car, and he had the keys. Instead, I curled up. I buried my head against my
chest while he touched me. I slapped blindly at his touches, as if I were batting away
mosquitos .... Finally, weary and weepy, I gave up. I remember the sting of my tears rolling
down my cheeks and into my ears as I lay on my back and he moaned. Then, I fell instantly
into sleep, as if from the top of a mountain. Our weekend ended early, because I was sullen
and that made him angry. There was nothing to say on the long ride home. I never called what
happened that night "rape." I still don't. But it wasn't bliss either.
Id.
Although questioning rape and its maleness, Estrich's and Ager's queries about rape do not involve
discussions on the physical act of penetration, rather they ponder the notice given to the male.
32. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1114.
In a very real sense, the "reasonable" woman under the view of the.., judges who would
reverse Mr. Rusk's conviction is not a woman at all. Their version of a reasonable person is
one who does not scare easily, one who does not feel vulnerability, one who is not passive, one
who fights back, not cries. The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy "sissy." She
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maleness, courts have continually upheld the validity of force, threats of force, or
a showing of against the woman's will. Law review articles and cases discussing
the penetration requirement have addressed it from the premise that some
penetration should be required.33
What intrigues me is the origin of the penetration requirement and how we
moved from the common law punishment of death for the crime of rape34 to the
Supreme Court's opinion that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment... and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment. 35 Drawing analogies to the force requirement, the
penetration requirement and the inability to punish rape by death suggest that the
penetration issue might also be male: a male understanding of what is necessary
for the crime and punishment of rape.
This Article explores the penetration requirement and considers the following:
is a real man.
Id. Estrich was responding to the majority opinion in the Maryland Court of Appeals' case, State v.
Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). In Rusk, the victim met Rusk at a bar. See id. at 721. She followed
him home, and upon arriving at his home she realized she was in an unfamiliar neighborhood, and when
asked to come upstairs to his apartment, she refused. See id. Rusk reached into the victim's car,
removed her keys, and then asked, "Now will you come up?" See id. The victim stated that at this
point she was "scared" because he had her car keys and she was in unfamiliar surroundings, so she
followed him up to his apartment. See id. Rusk left the victim in his apartment while he walked across
the hall to the bathroom; upon returning, the victim began to "beg" Rusk to let her go, and he responded
"no." See id. The victim then became "really" scared and testified that it was more the look in his eyes
that caused her to do what he wanted. See id. She proceeded to have oral sex and then sexual
intercourse. See id. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the reversal of Rusk's conviction was
in error because the reasonableness of the victim's fear was plainly a question of fact for the jury. See
id. at 727. Judge Cole stated in his dissenting opinion that the evidence was insufficient for a
conviction of rape. See id. at 728 (Cole, J., dissenting). Judge Cole stated that "[i]n the absence of any
verbal threat to do her grievous bodily harm ... [it is] difficult to understand how a victim could
participate in these sexual activities and not be willing." Id. at 734 (Cole, J., dissenting). Judge Cole's
lack of understanding could be attributed to his maleness.
33. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. But see MacKinnon, supra note 15, at 647
(noting that although women resent non-consensual sexual penetration, the "penile invasion of the
vagina may be less pivotal to women's sexuality, pleasure or violation, than it is to male sexuality").
The requirement of penetration represents a male-defined loss, namely the male's exclusive access to
the female. MacKinnon suggests that rape is more like a crime against female monogamy rather than
an offense against her sexuality. See id.
34. Originally, rape was a capital offense. See gernerally Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-95
(1977) (discussing the history of punishment for rape). How bad is rape? Recognizing the heinousness
of rape, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
stated that the "'crime against nature' was an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape"-suggesting that
rape, although bad, is not all that bad. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting
BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 215). Part of the problem is the sad and mistaken belief that rape is sex.
35. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
(1) whether it is a male or reasonable person understanding of what is so violative
of a woman's body that it should be referred to as rape; and (2) what punishment
should be imposed. This Article explores problems raised by the "foreplay" issue.
Understanding that rape is not sex, in order to deem a violation, one must
understand how a violation is characterized. In addition to defining what is
violative, the foreplay issue raises questions about characterizations from a male
perspective concerning when a male is placed on notice by the female that she
either no longer wishes to engage in the activity and that he should stop or that this
is unwelcome conduct altogether and that he should stop. The focus has been on
the male's notice rather than the desires of the female to stop the conduct. An
additional problem is that the crime of rape may be lessened if penetration is
deemed insignificant. If penetration, a male prerequisite for the crime of rape, is
not used to determine severity of the violation, then there may be some concern
that stiff penalties may no longer be imposed, that is, if men comprehend the
violation, then it is not a violation. If stiff penalties are not imposed, then there
could be a significant increase in rapes.
Part I of this Article discusses how society defines criminal conduct and why
society punishes this type of conduct.36 Part II explores the punishment theory,
with regard to rape, from the woman's perspective of pain and pleasure.37 This
Article then compares what is pleasurable for women, and from this perspective,
what should be punishment for conduct that is deemed violative from the woman's
point of reference of pain and pleasure.3" Part III addresses some solutions and
perhaps, redirection in defining and punishing the crime of rape. 39 Finally, Part IV
concludes that the severity of the invasion into the private, protected sphere of a
woman's body should be defined in women's terms and punished accordingly.40
I. DEFINING AND PUNISHING CRIMINAL ACTS
"A crime is any social harm defined and made punishable by law. 41
Blackstone defined crime as "an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public
law, either forbidding or commanding it."42 Although Blackstone noted the vicious
will on the part of the actor, his focus was on the act.43 Bishop, however, defined
36. See infra notes 41-83 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 112-43 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 144-71 and accompanying text.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.
41. RONALD N. BOYCE & ROLLN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2, at 5 (7th ed.
1989).
42. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 5.
43. See id. at 21. Blackstone translated the latin phrase actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea as
"an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all." See id.; see also Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895) (discussing Blackstone's definition of crime).
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crime in terms of the "wrong" done." According to Bishop, "'a crime is any wrong
which the government deems injurious to the public at large, and punishes through
ajudicial proceeding in its own name.'" 45 Thus, Blackstone's focus was on the act
itself while Bishop focused on the social harm. Blackstone's approach, also known
as the modem approach, "takes the act-the range of the actor's control over what
happens-as the core of the crime."46 Bishop's traditionalist approach "emphasizes
the victim's suffering and the actor's responsibility for bringing about irreversible
damage." 47 George P. Fletcher made the following observations:
The traditionalists root their case in the way we feel about crime and suffering.
Modernists hold to arguments of rational and meaningful punishment. Despite what
we might feel, the modernist insists, reason demands that we limit the criminal law
to those factors that are within the control of the actor. The occurrence of harm is
beyond his control and therefore ought not to have weight in the definition of crime
and fitting punishment.
48
Fletcher also observed that "[s]ometime in the last two or three centuries, our
scientific thinking about crime began to shift from the harm done to the act that
brings about the harm."49 Furthermore, "[i]nstead of seeing harm first and the
action as the means for bringing about the harm, we are now inclined to see the
action first and the harm as a contingent consequence of the action." '0
Most criminal statutes focus on the act, following Blackstone rather than
Bishop's social harm. Criminologists and sociologists, however, have defined
crime in broader terms, that is, a crime is not such until it is recognized as a crime
by law. 5' In the absence of a penal provision, a statute cannot be the basis for
criminal prosecution.52 Blackstone's focus on the act is problematic because any
act is not a crime; Bishop's focus on a social harm is also flawed because of who
44. See State v. Jackson, 77 So. 196, 198 (La. 1917) (quoting 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW 32
(8th ed. 1892)).
45. Id. (quoting BISHOP, supra note 44, at 32).




49. Id. at 65.
50. Id.
51. See A. KEITH BOTTOMLEY, CRIMINOLOGY IN Focus: PASTTRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 1-
38 (1979).
52. See id.
defines social harms-judges, lawyers, legislatures, an all male review? "
Rape is an invasion of a woman's body in which her "private, personal inner
space" is violated. 4 The act of rape denies a woman autonomy by abridging her
right to determine when, with whom, and how she will allow an individual to enter
her zone of body privacy. In addition to the physical harm, the crime of rape grants
a man domination over the woman's zone of body privacy.
Of course, the common law no longer guides rape. 5 Today, state statutes
guide rape. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), the crime of rape occurs when
the following happens:
A male... has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife ... and compels her to
submit by force or by threat of [force] ... [or] has substantially impaired her power
to appraise or control her conduct by administering... without her knowledge drugs
[and] the female is unconscious... [or she] is less than 10 years old. 6
Sexual intercourse, under the MPC, "includes intercourse per os or per anum, with
some penetration however slight. '57  Sexual assault, under the MPC, includes
sexual contact: "[The] touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire."58 Under statutory law and
under the MPC, rape begins to be "a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime when
it looks like sex. 5 9 In other words, reference to rape as sexual intercourse suggests
that rape is not a crime if it is sex. But rape is not sex.
The MPC and its followers suggest that sexual intercourse has to include
penetration of the vagina, however slight, and anything less is not rape because it
53. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1091.
In one of his most celebrated essays, Oliver Wendell Holmes explained that the law does not
exist to tell the good man what to do, but to tell the bad man what not to do. Holmes was
interested in the distinction between the good and bad man; I cannot help noticing that both
are men. Most of the time a criminal law that reflects male views and male standards imposes
its judgment on men who have injured other men. It is "boys rules" applied to a boys' fight.
In rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women, and male standards are
used not only to judge men, but also to judge the conduct of women victims. Moreover,
because the crime involves sex itself, the law of rape inevitably treads on the explosive ground
of sex roles, of male aggression and female passivity, of our understandings of sexuality-areas
where differences between a male and a female perspective may be most pronounced.
Id.
54. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 19, at 376.
55. At common law, rape was forced sexual intercourse by a man against a woman who was not his
wife. Today, both men and women can be raped, and in some jurisdictions married people can be raped
by their spouses. But rape is dealt with in terms of men having an entitlement to invade a woman's
body, unless and until she says "no." In that sense, rape remains relational as it did at common law.
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(I)(a)-(d) (1962). The Model Penal Code provides guidelines for
states to use in defining criminal offenses.
57. Id. § 213.0(2).
58. Id. § 213.4(8).
59. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 172.
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is not intercourse. Thus, the touching of the female's sex organ, without the
penetration of the vagina, cannot constitute rape under the MPC. Rape, however,
is not sex; it is a crime, and it is a crime of violence. The crime is complete when
the act is done, or the social harm has occurred. The act is done when the female's
private, personal inner space is violated, and that space is violated when an
uninvited individual enters the zone of protected pleasures.
Under the MPC, victimizers are punished less severely if they are known by
their victims. 6° However, strangers or friends, if uninvited, equally violate the
protected sphere.
There are noted distinctions between the common law and the MPC. Under
the MPC, rape is defined in terms of the victimizer's positive acts of aggression,
the victim's age, or the victim's physical condition. Under common law, the focus
is on the victim's lack of consent. Thus, the common law uses negative terms of
the victim's lack of consent in determining whether the conduct was rape while the
MPC uses the victim's lack of consent to demonstrate that a rape occurred.
Many states use sexual assault as opposed to rape to define what was initially
defined as rape at common law.6' Florida chose the term sexual battery in an effort
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1).
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious
bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor
upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which
cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
Id.
61. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(1) (1994) ("A male commits the crime of rape in the first degree
if he engages in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion."); ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.410(a)(1) (Michie 1996) ("Sexual assault in the first degree [is when] the offender engages in
sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person."); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1406(A) (West 1989) ("Sexual assault is intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or
oral sexual contact with any person without consent of such person."); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-103(a)
(Michie 1997) ("A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse.., with another person.");
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(1) (West 1986) ("Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual
intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree."); Id. § 18-3-
404(1) ("Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits sexual assault in
the third degree."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a)(1) (West 1998) ("Sexual assault in the first
degree is when a person engages in sexual intercourse .. "); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1)(a) (1993)
("A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the first degree if: (a) The person knowingly
subjects another person to an act of sexual penetration by... compulsion .. "); Id. § 707-731(1)(b)
("T'he person knowingly subjects to sexual penetration another person who is mentally defective,
mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless."); Id. § 707-732(l)(a) ("A person commits the offense
of sexual assault in the third degree if the person recklessly subjects another person to an act of sexual
penetration by compulsion."); Id. § 707-733(1)(a)-(b) ("A person commits the offense of sexual assault
in the fourth degree if: (a) The person knowingly subjects another person to sexual contact by
compulsion or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion; [or] (b) The
person knowingly exposes the person's genitals to another person under circumstances in which the
actor's conduct is likely to alarm the other person ... or put the other person in fear of bodily injury.
..."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 1998) ("Criminal sexual assault [is] ... an
act of sexual penetration ...."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(a)(l)-(3) (Michie 1998) ("[A] person
who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex when: (1) the
other person is compelled by force...; (2) the other person is unaware that the sexual intercourse is
occurring; or (3) the other person is so mentally disabled ... that consent to sexual intercourse cannot
be given ...."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501(1) (Supp. 1994) ("'Sexual intercourse' means any
penetration of the female sex organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object. Any penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse."); Id. § 21-3501(2)(a)-(b) ("'Sodomy'
means oral contact or oral penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia; anal
penetration, however slight, of a male or female by any body part or object; or oral or anal copulation
or sexual intercourse between a person and an animal. 'Sodomy' does not include penetration of the
anal opening by a finger or object in the course of the performance of: (a) Generally recognized health
care practices; or (b) a body cavity search conducted in accordance with K.S.A. 22-2520 through 22-
2524, and amendments thereto."); Id. § 21-3502(1)(a) ("Rape is: (1) Sexual intercourse with a person
who does not consent to the sexual intercourse, under any of the following circumstances: (A) When
the victim is overcome by force or fear; [or] (B) when the victim is unconscious or physically powerless
....."); Id. § 21-3517(a) ("Sexual battery is the intentional touching of the person of another who is 16
or more years of age, who is not the spouse of the offender and who does not consent thereto, with the
intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the offender or another."); Id. § 21-3518(a)(l)-(2)
("Aggravated sexual battery is the intentional touching of the person of another who is 16 or more years
of age and who does not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the
offender or another under any of the following circumstances: (1) When the victim is overcome by force
or fear; [or] (2) when the victim is unconscious or physically powerless."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.010(7) (Michie 1988) ("'Sexual contact' means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of a person done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party .... ); Id. § 510.010(8)
("'Sexual intercourse' means sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense and includes penetration of the
sex organs or anus of one person by a foreign object manipulated by another person. Sexual intercourse
occurs upon any penetration, however slight; emission is not required. 'Sexual intercourse' does not
include penetration of the sex organ or anus by a foreign object in the course of the performance of
generally recognized health care practices .... );Id. § 510.020(l)-(2) (Michie Supp. 1988) ("Whether
or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this chapter that the sexual act was
committed without consent of the victim.... Lack of consent results from: ... [fnorcible compulsion
... [or i]ncapacity to consent .. "); Id. § 510.040(l)(a)-(b) (Michie 1985) ("A person is guilty of rape
in the first degree when: (a) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible
compulsion; or (b) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent
....."); Id. § 510.050(1) ("A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, being eighteen (18)
years old or more, he engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than fourteen (14) years
old."); Id. § 510.060(l)(a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1988) ("A person is guilty of rape in the third degree
when: (a) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent because
he is mentally retarded or mentally incapacitated; (b) Being twenty-one (21) years old or more, he
engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than sixteen (16) years old."); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:41 (A)-(B) (West 1997) ("Rape is the act of anal or vaginal sexual intercourse .... [A]ny
sexual penetration, vaginal or anal, however slight, is sufficient .... ); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
462(a) (1997) ("[First degree rape occurs] if the person engages in vaginal intercourse ...."); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22(a) (West 1990) ("[Rape is] sexual intercourse or unatural sexual
intercourse."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West 1998) ("[Criminal sexual conduct is] sexual
penetration with another person...."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1998) ("'Sexual
contact' means any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals or anus
of another person, or the breast of a female person, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire of any person;... 'Sexual intercourse' means any penetration, however slight, of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ, whether or not an emission results.") (discussing the 1979 Comment to
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to make the term gender neutral.62 The statutory penetration requirement varies
from state to state, and most statutes fail to define sexual intercourse. The statutes
require penetration during sexual intercourse, but it is not clear what has to be
penetrated.
The variations in definitions as to what constitutes sexual intercourse is part
of the problem in defining what has to be penetrated. With respect to the raping
1973 Proposed Code, which states that "[p]enetration, however slight (entry into the labia), is
sufficient"); Id. § 566.030(1) ("A person commits the crime of forcible rape if he has sexual intercourse
with another person by the use of forcible compulsion."); Id. § 566.040(1) ("A person commits the
crime of sexual assault if he has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without
that person's consent.") (discussing the 1979 Comment to 1973 Proposed Code, which states that while
continuing to label the defendant as a "rapist," "[t]he Code reserves that term for the most heinous
sexual offender"); Id. § 566.060(1) ("A person commits the crime of forcible sodomy if he has deviate
sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion.") (discussing the 1979
Comment to 1973 Proposed Code, which states that "[u]nder this statute the 'detestable' act is the
crime, and force, duress, or other lack of consent are immaterial");Id. § 566.070(1) ("A person commits
the crime of deviate sexual assault if he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person knowing that
he does so without that person's consent."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1) (1997) ("A person who
knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact without consent commits the offense of sexual
assault."); Id. § 45-5-503(1) ("A person who knowingly has sexual intercourse without consent with
another person commits the offense of sexual intercourse without consent."); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
61(A) (Michie Supp. 1998) ("[Rape is committed i]f any person has sexual intercourse with a
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse or causes a complaining witness, whether or not his
or her spouse, to engage in sexual intercourse with any other person and such act is accomplished..
. ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040(1) (West 1998) ("A person is guilty of rape in the first
degree when such a person engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion
..... "); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3(a)(1) (1997) ("A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree
when: (1) Such person engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person .. "); Id.
§ 61-8B-4(a)(1) ("A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when: (1) Such person
engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person without the person's consent, and
the lack of consent results from forcible compulsion .... "); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(1)(a) (West
1994) ("First degree sexual assault ... [is committed when a person h]as sexual contact or sexual
intercourse with another person without consent of that person and causes pregnancy or great bodily
harm to that person.").
62. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West Supp. 1998). The Florida Legislature's 1974 enactment
of the sexual battery statute elucidated the legislature's intent to afford protection against nonconsensual
invasions of sexual privacy to males as well as females. The impetus for replacing Florida's previous
rape statutes with section 794.011 of the Florida Statutes appears to be a 1973 appellate opinion holding
the following:
[M]ales are entitled to the same protection from degrading ravishment and sexual assault,
regardless of the orifice involved, as are females. It is no longer consonant with constitutional
principles of equal protection to continue a criminal sanction against sexual assaults on
females and not provide the same criminal sanction where such assaults are made on males.
See Brinson v. State, 278 So. 2d 317, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, Wilson v. State, 288 So.
2d 480 (Fla. 1974).
of a woman by a man, most states require penetration of the vagina.63
Defining what has to be penetrated is significant because if rape is viewed as
a crime against the woman,64 then any conduct that is perceived as violative to the
woman should be classified as rape. Many statutes, with respect to the penetration
element, provide that an offender has to engage in sexual intercourse.65 It is
assumed that penetration has to be effectuated in order for there to be sexual
intercourse. The statutes, however, fail to state what has to be penetrated-the
vagina, the vulva, the labia, or the clitoris? Some states refer to penetration of the
female organ without further defining penetration.66
63. See Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638,642 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) ("Sexual intercourse
is an element of rape. Sexual contact is an element of sexual abuse. Sexual intercourse always involves
sexual contact ... [but] sexual contact does not always involve intercourse.").
64. Today, most statutes are gender neutral, but rape originally was physical conduct executed on
a woman.
65. See supra note 61.
66. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (l)(h) (West 1997) ("'Sexual battery' means oral, anal, or
vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of
another by any other object ...."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (Supp. 1998) ("A person commits the
offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Carnal
knowledge in rape occurs when there is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.
The fact that the person allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a charge
of rape."); Id. § 16-6-22.1 (a)-(b) (1996) ("[Tlhe term 'intimate parts' means the primary genital area,
anus, groin, inner thighs, or buttocks of a male or female and the breasts of a female.... A person
commits the offense of sexual battery when he intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate
parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person."); Id. § 16-6-22.2(b) ("A person
commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery when he intentionally penetrates with a foreign object
the sexual organ or anus of another person without the consent of that person."); IDAHO CODE § 18-
6101 (1997) ("Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal, or vaginal opening
with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female under either of the following circumstances:
... Where she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied
by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating, narcotic, or anaesthetic substance administered
by or with the privity of the accused."); Id. § 18-6102 ("No conviction for rape can be had against one
who was under the age of fourteen (14) years at the time of the act alleged, unless his physical ability
to accomplish penetration is proved as an independent fact, and beyond a reasonable doubt."); Id. § 18-
6103 ('The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the female. Any
sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 251(1)(C) (West Supp. 1997) ("(1) Any act between 2 persons involving direct physical contact
between the genitals of one and the mouth or anus of the other, or direct physical contact between the
genitals of one and the genitals of the other; (2) Any act between a person and an animal being used by
another person which act involves direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the mouth
or anus of the other, or direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the genitals of the other;
or (3) Any act involving direct physical contact between the genitals or anus of one and an instrument
or device manipulated by another person when that act is done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact."); Id. § 253 ("A
person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and
... [t]he other person submits as a result of compulsion, as defined in section 251, subsection 1,
paragraph E; ... [a] person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with
another person and... [tihe actor has substantially impaired the other's person's power to appraise or
control the other person's sexual acts by administering or employing drugs, intoxicants or other similar
means;... [or tihe other person is unconscious or otherwise physically incapable of resisting and has
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Notwithstanding oral and anal penetration, it is clear that the male's sex organ
is the penis.67 It is not equally clear as to what is the female sex organ. Is the
female sex organ the vagina, the clitoris, or the vulva, which includes the vagina
and clitoris? 6s If the clitoris is a sex organ, can it be penetrated? To penetrate is
"to enter or force a way into; [to] pierce."69 Penetration is the "act or process of
piercing or penetrating something."7 ° How do we determine what constitutes a sex
organ? And what needs to be penetrated? And can it be penetrated? Defining the
female sex organ is necessary because some states require penetration of the
vaginal opening. I presume those jurisdictions are referring to the vagina as the
female sex organ.7' Recognizing that the requirement of penetration without
further explanation of what needs to be penetrated is insufficient for the crime of
rape, some states attempt to provide more protection for women.72 If there is
not consented to the sexual contact .... "); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (a) (West 1994 & Supp.
1998) ("A person commits an offense [of sexual assault] if the person: (1) intentionally or knowingly:
(A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of another person by any means, without
that person's consent; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual organ
of the actor, without that person's consent; or (C) causes the sexual organ of another person, without
that person's consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person,
including the actor; or (2) intentionally or knowingly: (A) causes the penetration of the anus or female
sexual organ of a child by any means .... ).
67. Although the tongue and other objects can penetrate, states refer to the penis as the male sex
organ. See supra note 66.
68. The vagina is "the passage leading from the external genital orifice to the uterus in female
mammals." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1413. The vulva is "the external
female genitalia including the labia majora, labia minora, clitoris, and vestibule of the vagina." Id. at
1438. The labia majora is defined as "[tiwo rounded folds of tissue that form the external lateral
boundaries of the vulva." Id. at 731. The labia minora is defined as the "[t]wo narrow folds of tissue
enclosed within the cleft of the labia majora. Also called 'nympha."' Id. The clitoris is defined as "[a]
small erectile organ at the upper end of the vulva, homologous with the penis." Id. at 252.
69, Id. at 969.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 66.
72, For example, Delaware protects against forced sexual intercourse or sexual contact, including
fellatio, cunnilingus, and touching by a foreign object. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761-75 (1996).
Specifically, sexual intercourse denotes any act of penetration, however slight, of the genitalia or anus
of one person by the mouth, anus or genitalia of another. See id. § 761(e)(1). Delaware defines fellatio
as "any oral contact with the male genitalia." Id. § 761(b). Sexual contact refers to "any intentional
touching of the anus, breast, buttocks, or genitalia of another person, which touching, under the
circumstances as viewed by a reasonable person, is sexual in nature." Id. § 761(f). In Delaware, one
has committed unlawful sexual penetration when "the person intentionally places [one] or more fingers
or thumbs or an object ... inside the vagina or anus of a person." See id. § 772.
The District of Columbia specifies that, in order to be guilty of first degree sexual abuse, a person
must engage in a sexual act. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4102 (1981).
Mississippi defines rape as carnal knowledge of an unmarried person, previously chaste, who is
between the ages of 14 and 18, and younger than the perpetrator. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-67
(1972). For the purpose of its sexual battery statute, Mississippi defines penetration to include
"cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or pederasty, any penetration of the genital or anal openings of another
person's body, and insertion of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body."
Id. § 97-3-97(a).
Nebraska's legislature statutorily expressed its intent "to enact laws dealing with sexual assault and
related sexual offenses which will protect the dignity of the victim at all stages of the judicial process."
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-317 (1995). In Nebraska, prohibited sexual contact includes "the intentional
touching of the victim's sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching of the immediate area of
the victim's sexual or intimate parts... or the clothing covering [such] parts... [when] such conduct
can reasonably be construed as being for the sexual arousal or gratification of either party." Id. § 28-
318(5). Nebraska defines intimate parts as "the genital area, groin, inner thighs, buttocks, or breasts."
Id. § 28-318(2). Under Nebraska law, "any person who subjects another person to sexual penetration
[without consent of the victim or in certain other limited circumstances] is guilty of sexual assault."
Id. § 28-319. Nebraska defines sexual penetration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal
intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the actor's or victim's body or any object
manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal openings of the victim's body which can be reasonably
construed as being for nonmedical and nonhealth purposes." Id. § 28-318(6).
Nevada defines sexual penetration as "cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal
openings of the body of another, including sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning." NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.364 (1995). Nevada further defines sexual seduction as "ordinary sexual intercourse, anal
intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio committed by a person 18 years of age or older with a consenting
person under the age of 16 years." Id. § 200.364(3).
New Hampshire defines sexual contact as "the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's sexual
or intimate parts, including breasts and buttocks, and the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's
clothing covering the immediate area of the victim or actor's sexual or intimate parts.., which can be
reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification." N.H.REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:l(1V) (1996). In New Hampshire, sexual penetration includes the following:
Sexual intercourse, . . . cunnilingus .... fellatio .... anal intercourse .... any intrusion,
however slight, of any part of the actor's body or any object manipulated by the actor into
genital or anal openings of the victim's body.... any intrusion, however slight, of any part of
the victim's body into genital or anal openings of the actor's body,... [or] any act which
forces, coerces, or intimidates the victim to perform any sexual penetration ... on the actor,
on another person, or on himself.
Id. § 632-A:l(V). New Hampshire defines genital openings as "the internal or external genitalia
including, but not limited to, the vagina, labia majora, labia minora, vulva, urethra, or perineum." Id.
§ 632-A: 1 (1). In New Hampshire, a person is guilty of aggravated felonious sexual assault if he engages
in sexual penetration with another person and subjects that person "to sexual contact and causes serious
personal injury to the victim." Id. § 632-A:2-3(l).
New Jersey defines sexual penetration as "vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal
intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or object into the anus or vagina either by
the actor or upon the actor's instruction. The depth of insertion shall not be relevant as to the question
of commission of the crime." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(c) (West 1996). Sexual contact is "an
intentional touching by the victim or actor, either directly or through clothing, of the victim's or actor's
intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually
gratifying the actor." Id. § 2C:14-1(d). Intimate parts include the "sexual organs, genital area, anal
area, inner thigh, groin, buttock, or breast of a person." Id. § 2C:14-1(e). In New Jersey, a person is
guilty of aggravated sexual assault if the person commits an act of sexual penetration in a number of
limited circumstances, including the use of physical force or coercion. See id. § 2C: 14-2 (West Supp.
1998).
In New Mexico, "criminal sexual penetration is the unlawful and intentional causing of a person to
engage in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse or the causing of penetration, to
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any extent and with any object, of the genital or anal openings of another." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11
(Michie Supp. 1998).
New York defines sexual intercourse as any penetration, however slight. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.00 (McKinney 1998). Sexual contact refers to "any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It
includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor,
whether directly or through clothing." Id. § 130.00(3).
North Carolina specifies that, in order to be guilty of first degree rape, a person must engage in
vaginal intercourse. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1993).
North Dakota defines a sexual act as the following:
[S]exual contact between human beings consisting of contact between the penis and the vulva,
the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or any other portion
of the human body and the penis, anus, or vulva; or the use of an object which comes in
contact with the victim's anus, vulva, or penis.., however slight.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(3) (1997). In North Dakota, sexual contact means "any touching of the
sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive
desires." Id. § 12.1-20-02(4). A person may be guilty of sexual assault if that person has reason to
believe that the sexual contact engaged in is offensive to the other person. See id. § 21.1-20-07.
Ohio provides that "no person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of
the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(a)(1)
(Anderson 1996). In Ohio, sexual contact is prohibited in all of the following:
(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person, or one of the
other persons, or is reckless in that regard; (2) The offender knows that the other person's, or
one of the other person's, ability to appraise the nature of or control the offender's or touching
person's conduct is substantially impaired; (3) The offender knows that the other person, or
one of the other persons, submits because of being unaware of the sexual contact.
Id. § 2907.06(a).
Oklahoma's legislature does not define rape. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 111.4(a) (1996).
In Oregon, a person commits third degree rape when "the person has sexual intercourse with another
person under 16 years of age." OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355(a) (1995).
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee merely define rape as penetration. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-2(a) (1995); S.D. CODFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(a) (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
502(a) (1996).
In South Carolina, a person commits first degree criminal sexual conduct if the person "uses
aggravated force to accomplish sexual battery." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (Law Co-op 1985).
Sexual battery is "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person's body." Id. § 16-3-651.
Utah's legislature defined aggravated sexual assault as the following:
[I]f in the course of a rape, object rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse or attempted forcible sexual abuse, the actor: (a)
causes bodily injury to the victim; (b) uses or threatens the victim by use of a dangerous
weapon ... ; or (c) compels, or attempts to compel, the victim to submit to rape, object to rape,
forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse, by threat of kidnapping, death or serious bodily
injury to be inflicted on any person ....
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-405(1) (1995).
In 1981, the Vermont legislature passed a general amendment, stating that "the statutory revision
commission is directed to revise Vermont statutes to delete the word 'rape' and insert the words 'sexual
assault."' See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251 (Supp. 1997). The Vermont legislature defined sexual
contact with the clitoris by the penis, is it rape or is it a lesser offense because the
vagina was not penetrated? Delaware's unlawful sexual intercourse statute is
common to most jurisdictions. Delaware's statute provides that one is guilty of a
class A felony when the person intentionally engages in sexual
intercourse "without the victim's consent. 7 3 Sexual intercourse is defined as
"[a]ny act of physical union of the genitalia or anus of [one] person with the mouth,
anus or genitalia of another person. It occurs upon any penetration, however
slight."74 Sexual intercourse is also defined as "[a]ny act of cunnilingus or fellatio,
regardless of whether penetration occurs. 75 Cunnilingus is "any oral contact with
the female genitalia. 7 6 Sexual contact is "any intentional touching of the anus,
breast, buttocks or genitalia of another person, which touching, under the
circumstances as viewed by a reasonable person, is sexual in nature. Sexual
contact shall also include touching of those specified areas when covered by
clothing."7 7 The unlawful sexual contact is a class F felony, a lesser crime than the
class A unlawful sexual intercourse crime.78 This statute raises a problem: if the
clitoris, the female sex organ, the female genitalia, was touched and the touching
was sexual in nature, would this constitute rape (unlawful sexual intercourse) or
would this be the offense of sexual contact? For the woman, the physical contact
of her genitalia, her clitoris, her sex organ by the penis or any object may be
considered to be as violative as the penetration of her vagina. Delaware, like most
jurisdictions, failed to declare that the battery of the clitoris is as serious of an
assault as engagement in a sexual act with another person without that person's consent or by force or
threat of force. See id. § 3252. The legislature defined sexual act as the following:
[C]onduct between persons consisting of contact between the penis and the vulva, the penis
and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or any intrusion, however
slight, by any part of a person's body or any object into the genital or anal opening of another.
Id. § 3251(1).
Wyoming provides that "any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault
in the first degree if the victim submitted due to force or threats of severe force." WYo. STAT. ANN. §
6-2-302 (Michie 1997). Wyoming defines sexual intrusion as the following:
(A) any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the
mouth, tongue, or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual
intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification
or abuse; . . . [or] (B) . . . sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal
intercourse with or without emission.
Id. § 6-2-301(vii). In contrast, Wyoming defines sexual contact as "touching, with the intention of
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's
intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's
intimate parts." Id. § 6-2-301 (a)(vii). Intimate parts include "the external genitalia, perineum, anus or
pubes of any person or the breast of a female person." Id. § 6-2-301 (a)(ii).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 775(a) (1996).
74. Id. § 76 1(e)(1). "This offense encompasses the crimes commonly known as rape and sodomy
.... " Id.
75. Id. § 761(e)(2).
76. Id. § 761(a).
77. Id. § 761(0.
78. See id. § 769.
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offense as the penetration of the vagina. Because there is no opening, the clitoris
cannot be penetrated, and therefore, the crime is not severe enough to constitute the
crime of rape.79
California, unlike Delaware, allows for penetration of the female genitalia or
of the vagina. 0 It is unclear if other jurisdictions might permit rape without
penetration of the vagina. For example, Nebraska courts have consistently held
that rape requires the "slightest penetration of the sexual organ."'" The courts,
however, failed to define sexual organ. Other jurisdictions require any sexual
penetration, however slight, if the other elements are proven beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 The other elements dealt with whether force or threat of force was present
and had nothing to do with what was penetrated.83
How do we determine the severity of a violation? What are the standards and
who decides? Today, discussions are more open and acceptable; at the same time,
more rapes are occurring, in particular, rapes by acquaintances. Perhaps the
increase in rapes is attributable more to an increase in the number of rapes being
reported as opposed to an increase in actual incidence; nonetheless, there is a
substantial increase in the number of rapes. Hopefully, we have moved away from
the notion that women are the property of men and are moving towards the
autonomy of women and in equalizing protections of women. A move away from
property rights should be a move towards the rights of the woman. Because rape
laws were originally written to protect men's chattel, and today we know that
women are not the chattel of men, our laws today should be written in a way that
a man does not automatically have the right to touch a woman until she stops him.
Instead, men should have the responsibility of getting an affirmative response from
a woman before touching her in any way. Rather than forcing women to say "no"
before a man has to halt his touching, a more reasonable guidepost is requiring men
to obtain a "yes" before they begin.
This approach places women in the position to decide who can touch, what can
be touched, and when she can be touched. This approach provides the woman with
the opportunity to set the bounds of her privacy interests and places the
responsibility on men to get an affirmative response before they act. Women,
79. See supra notes 68 & 72.
80. See People v. Karsai, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that penetration is
not necessary for the crime of rape), overruled by People v. Jones, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Cal. 1988)
(overruling on sentencing grounds only).
81. See State v. Tatum, 294 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Neb. 1980) (citing State v. Holloman, 248 N.W.2d
15, 20 (Neb. 1976); State v. Atkinson, 209 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Neb. 1973)).
82. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 499 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Kackley v. State, 493
A.2d 364, 366-67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
83. See Anderson, 499 So. 2d at 1254; Kackley, 493 A.2d at 368.
rather than men, will then set the boundaries, and perhaps over time, rapes will
decrease because men will understand that they have no right to touch unless
invited. This approach will also allow women to determine their pains and
pleasures, rather than allowing such determinations to be made based upon the age-
old property right entitlement that men, early in our history, had over women.
Society dictates pains and pleasures, but women, rather than men, should define
what is painful or pleasurable to a woman, in particular with respect to the female
genitalia.
1I. OUR LAWS ARE DIRECTED BY SOCIETY'S PAINS AND PLEASURES
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters -
pain and pleasure. It is for these masters alone to point out what we ought to do,
as well as to determine what we shall do. They govern us in all that we do, in all
that we say, in all that we think; every effort we can make to throw off our
subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In other words, a man may
pretend to abjure his empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.
In an introduction to Jeremy Bentham's The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined,
editor Charles Warren Everett highlighted Bentham's view on how pleasure and
pain govern man:
"Pleasures then and the avoidance of pains," Bentham maintained, "are the
ends which the legislator has in view; it behooves him therefore to understand their
value.-Pleasures and pains are the instruments he has to work with: it behooves him
therefore to understand their force." To learn the dimensions of value of a pleasure
or pain [Bentham] thought there were seven important circumstances to be
considered: 1. its intensity; 2. its duration; 3. its certainty or uncertainty; 4. its
propinquity or remoteness; 5. its fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed
by sensations of the same kind; 6. its purity; and 7. its extent, or the number of
persons who are affected by it.8
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common is to
augment the total happiness of the community; therefore, in the first place, laws
must exclude, as far as may be possible, every thing that tends to subtract from the
happiness: in other words, exclude mischief."5
Society constructs a zone where all its citizens are protected from certain
harms. There are certain uncomfortable and unprotected spheres within protected
zones. While society acknowledges that there are some uncomforts that all citizens
have to "live" with, all citizens still share in the protections from other uncomforts.
84. See Charles Warren Everett, Editor's Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMIrrS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 3, 26 (Charles Warren Everett ed., Greenwood Press 1970) (1945) (quoting
JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 116 (1838)).
85. See id. at 38.
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What becomes problematic is the determination of who should define where and
what the zones of protections are to be. Men have always been at the bulwark of
our society and have generally determined the zones of our protections. However,
within the circumference of those zones lie both men and women, beings who are
the products of social constructs. Can men define the protected zones for both men
and women? Are there spheres that are necessary for the protection of women that
differ from those necessary for the protection of men?
A. Sex and Gender: Is There a Woman's Perspective?
Our cultural, social, political, economic, and legal constructions of gender and
sexuality privilege the experiences and understandings of males as the unstated
norms. In order to better understand how women have been subordinated in law
and society, theorists have articulated a sex and gender model. There are several
approaches as to how the sex and gender model is discussed. Status and power are
important, according to contemporary theorists, as they relate to behavior and
attitudes.8 6 These theorists treat sex as something separate and distinct from
gender; they use sex to represent one's biology, while gender represents the social
and "cultural expectations of those in a certain sex category."'  "Sex is
important ... as a static cue that assigns people to a particular gender category,
hence biological properties are relevant only as they are socially meaningful." 8
The theorists treat "culture as if it [is] completely separate and distinguishable from
biology." 9 Gender is "one's sense of oneself as male or female," and the
distinction between sex and gender suggests that gender "is not bound to one's
biological sex." 9° The problem with this view is that it "risks overlooking
important biologically linked aspects of women's... experiences.'"9' "[Bodies are
subject to cultural interpretation, but an emphasis on gender to the exclusion of sex
(or on culture to the exclusion of biology) may disregard potentially important
aspects of people's lives. A belief that biology is irrelevant may... hold women
to a male standard of behavior."92 Although biology is a product of culture, it is
86. See Stephanie Riger, Rethinking the Distinction Between Sex and Gender, in LESLIE BENDER
& DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CiviL. RIGHTs READER 232, 232-33 (1995).
87. See id. at 233.
88. Id.
89. Id. The problem with treating culture as separate and distinct from biology is that "culture is
always mediated by biology." See id. at 238.
90. See id. at 233.
91. See id. at 234. "A woman's breastfeeding may affect her attitude toward her children, while
a stressful occupation may affect women's and men's physiology in different ways." Id.
92. Id.
not limited to reproducing cultural stereotypes.93 The socially constructed nature
of biology allows the possibility of bias.94
Women are "materially connected to other human life. Men aren't. " 95
Furthermore, "[t]he potential for material connection with the other defines
women's subjective, phenomenological and existential state, just as surely as the
inevitability of material separation from the other defines men's existential state."96
Women's "potential for material connection engenders pleasures and pains, values
and dangers, and attractions and fears, which are entirely different from those
which follow, for men, from the necessity of separation. 9 7 Under the connective
theory, " [a]ccording to cultural feminist accounts of women's subjectivity, women
value intimacy. 99 Radical feminists' accounts of women's subjectivity is different
than that of the cultural feminists. Radical feminists believe that "women's
potential for material 'connection' invites invasion into the physical integrity of
women's bodies, and intrusion into the existential integrity of [women's lives]." 99
"Although women may 'officially' value the intimacy of connection,.... [women]
'unofficially' dread the intrusion it inevitably entails, and long for the individuation
93. See id. at 237.
94. An example of biology as culture is demonstrated in the research on the egg and the sperm. See
id. Researchers study fertilization "through a lens of stereotypes of masculinity and femininity that
colors what they see." See id. For example, "[m]ales are seen as producing sperm while females shed
eggs.... the sperm is described in active terms, such as 'burrow' and 'penetrate,' while the lowly egg
'is transported' or even 'drifts.' The heroic sperm ventures up a dark passageway to find the dormant
egg, the prize of its perilous journey." Id. The fertilization process is described "in terms that
'feminized' the passive egg and 'masculinized' the active, aggressive sperm." Id. "Current research
suggests that adhesive molecules on the surface of the egg trap the sperm. Rather than a passive
maiden, the egg now is depicted as an aggressive sperm-catcher.... [T]his picture too taints new data
with old stereotypes: the egg is now portrayed as engulfing and devouring rather than passive and
waiting." Id.
95. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 15. Cultural feminists summarize feminism as follows:
[W]omen's potential for a material connection to life entails (either directly.., or indirectly,
through the reproduction of mothering) an experiential and psychological sense of connection
with other human life, which in turn entails both women's concept of value, and women's
concept of them. Women's concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy,
individuality, justice and rights, as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy,
nurturance, community, responsibility and care. For women, the creation of value, and the
living of a good life, therefore depend upon relational, contextual, nurturant and affective
responses to the needs of those who are dependent and weak, while for men the creation of
value, and the living of the good life, depend upon the ability to respect the rights of
independent co-equals, and the deductive, cognitive ability to infer from those rights rules for
safe living. Women's concept of harm revolves not around a fear of annihilation by the other
but around a fear of separation and isolation from the human community on which she
depends, and which is dependent on her.
See id. at 28.
99. See id. at 15.
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and independence that deliverance from that state of connection would permit. "'0
What becomes even more problematic for women is that the rule of law does not
value intimacy. Law values autonomy.
On the opposite end of the scientific reproduction of culture spectrum is the
notion that "culture is always biologically-bound. ' ' Some of the ways in which
the sexes universally differ regard physical capacities and experiences.102 For
instance, only women menstruate, get pregnant, and miscarry; conversely, "men
are, on average, larger and stronger than women."10 3 However, these differences
"define only central tendencies among human capacities, while the form that these
capacities take is heavily dependent on social and cultural conditions. "'04 Although
gender and sex are inextricably entwined, gender is "what a culture makes of
sex."' 05 For example, most "humans are born with a motor capacity to smile, but
what they smile at is shaped by culture."' 6
The approach to sex equality within the political, legal, and social perceptions
is "equality is an equivalence, not a distinction, and sex is a distinction."'0' 7 Equal
treatment under the law is both a "systemic norm and a specific legal doctrine,..
. [that is] treating likes alike and unlikes unlike; and the sexes are defined by their
mutual unlikeness."'08 Gender then is "socially constructed as difference
epistemologically; sex discrimination law bounds gender equality by difference
100. Id.
101. See Riger, supra note 86, at 238. "Because the elements of culture that shape our biological
beings are themselves experienced biologically, culture is always mediated by biology." See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 238-39.
105. See id. at 240; Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1995).
Contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence accepts as oneof its foundational premises
the notion that sex and gender are two distinct aspects of human identity. That is, it assumes
that the identities male and female are different from the characteristics masculine and
feminine. Sex is regarded as a product of nature, while gender is understood as a function of
culture. This disaggregation of sex from gender represents a central mistake of equality
jurisprudence.
... In many cases, biology operates as the excuse or cover for social practices .... In the
end, biology or anatomy serve as metaphors for a kind of inferiority that characterizes society's
view of women.
Id.
106. See Riger, supra note 86, at 240.
107. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32
(1987).
108. See id.
doctrinally."'09 Sex equality becomes a contradiction in terms because equality
presupposes sameness and sex presupposes differences."0 Under this equality
thesis, man becomes the measure of things, and women are either treated the same
as men or different from men."'
B. The Pains and Pleasures of Women As Sexual Beings
Women are damned if they enjoy sex and damned if they do not. Although
women are defined as sexual beings, they are sexual beings in relation to their
abilities to satisfy men, and they are not allowed to view themselves as sexual
beings if it is unrelated to the sexual desires of men.
Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, sex researchers assumed that women
were asexual beings. A woman who enjoyed sex was believed to be ill or
pathological. Havelock Ellis disputed this belief, maintaining that women are not
only sexual beings, but that their sexual desire is comparable to that of men.112
Ellis believed the sexual impulse to be different in women because their impulse
is more passive, more complex, less spontaneous, and stronger after sexual
relationships are established." 3 Ellis also claimed that women's "threshold of
excess [is] less easily reached [and their] sexual sphere is larger and more diffused
with more periodicity."' 14 Generally, Ellis thought that there is "greater variation
[in sexual response]-both among women and within a single woman." 115 He
believed that the difference is basically biological in nature.1 6 For the man, the
sexual impulse is concentrated in the erect penis." 7 Ellis rejected the idea that
female sex is exclusively vaginal and argued that the sexual impulse for women is
109. Id. at 32-33.
110. Seeid.at33.
111. See id.
[S]hould you have to be the same as a man to get what a man gets simply because he is one?
Why does maleness provide an original entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its gender,
so that it is women-women who want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world men
have made in their image (this is really the point Aristotle missed)-who have to show in effect
that they are men in every relevant respect.
Id. at 37. When I began discussions about looking at rape from a woman's perspective and the
requirement that the crime of rape does not have the element of penetration, many colleagues and
students told me that removing the penetration requirement would be a grave mistake because men
would not understand how women are raped without penetration. When I responded that they were
thinking about it from a male's perspective, they stated that rape needs to be defined so men understand
the severity of the pain. My response was that is what I'm trying to do, only I'm trying to make them
see it through a woman's eyes and not through their own.
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spread throughout the genital area, thebreast, and even the womb." 8 Therefore,
it is because women have a more diffuse erogenous region that they are more
sexual and that their sexuality is different." 9
It has long been known that the clitoris is endlessly more sensitive than the
vagina, and judging from the number of nerve endings, more sensitive than the
penis as well. 2° In fact, anatomically, the clitoris and the penis have many
similarities because they develop from the same cells in the female or male fetus.
Women experience two types of orgasms-vaginal and clitoral. 121 The vaginal
type is adapted to the male anatomy and suits male pleasure. Unlike vaginal
orgasms, clitoral orgasms do not require male type conduct. Clitoral orgasms,
nonetheless, are more pleasurable to a woman than vaginal orgasms. 2 2 Because
118. See id. at 84-85. Recently, America dealt with a sensitive issue arising out of allegations of
sexual (mis)conduct between President William Jefferson Clinton and Monica Lewinsky. The
allegations of sexual conduct between the two provided an opportunity for society to consider Ellis'
perspective concerning female sexuality. In the allegations of sexual conduct between the two, Ms.
Lewinsky gave detailed accounts of her sexual interactions with the President. On several, alleged,
encounters, Ms. Lewinsky stated that the President ."put his hand down my pants and stimulated me
manually in the genital area."' See THE STARR REPORT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S COMPLETE
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 73 (Pocket Books 1998)
[hereinafter STARR REPORT]. On another occasion, she stated, "'he went to go put his hands down my
pants, and then I unzipped them because it was easier. And I didn't have any panties on. And so he
manually stimulated me.... I wanted him to touch my genitals with his genitals' and he did so, lightly
and without penetration." See id. at 116-17. Even though Ms. Lewinsky alleged that on several
occasions she performed oral sex on the President, the extent of her sexual arousals and stimulations
did not involve penetration of her vagina. See id. at 55.
119. See BULLOUGH, supra note 112, at 85.
120. See RUTH HERSCHBERGER, ADAM'S RIB 32-33 (Ha/Row Books 1970) (1948) ("It was quite
a feat of nature to grant the small clitoris the same number of nerves as the penis. It was an even more
incredible feat that society should actually have convinced the possessors of this organ that it was
sexually inferior to the penis.")
121. See Alix Shuman, Organs and Orgasms, in WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY: STUDIES IN POWER AND
POWERLESSNESS 198, 198-99 (Vivian Gomick & Barbara K. Moran eds., 1971).
122. With this in mind, it becomes clear why female circumcision involves the external female
genitalia. Female circumcision is an operation performed in some instances to reduce women's sexual
desires. See Robyn Cemy Smith, Female Circumcision: Bringing Women's Perspectives into the
International Debate, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2449, 2481 (1992). Female circumcision is "'necessary to
enforce women's total emotional, erotic loyalty and subservience to men.... [Miale power include[sl
the power of men ... to deny women our own sexuality [and) force (male sexuality) upon them,"' and
thereby denying women the right to control their sexuality. See id. at 2482 (alternations in original)
(quoting Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE POWERS OF
DESIRE 177,182-83) (Ann Snitowet al. eds., 1983)). There are "three different surgical procedures that
remove all or part of a woman's external genitalia." Id. at 2450. These procedures are as follows:
The first operation, called circumcision, is the least severe. It consists of the removal of the
prepuce of the clitoris, preserving the clitoris itself and the larger parts of the labia minora
(small lips of the vagina). The second operation, called excision or clitoridectomy, consists
vaginal orgasms require male type conduct, they are deemed more violative than
contact with the clitoris. From a woman's perspective, a violation of the clitoris
may be more severe because of the pleasures that the clitoris brings to the woman.
Society shapes sexuality. We can make any decision about our sexual
behavior, but our imagination and ability to carry out those decisions is limited by
the surrounding culture. For example, sadomasochism (S/M) is usually portrayed
as a violent, dangerous activity, and most people do not think that there is a great
deal of difference between a rapist and a bondage enthusiast.'23 Sadomasochism
is not a form of sexual assault; it is consensual activity that involves polarized roles
and intense sensations. 124 "A sadomasochist is well aware that a role adopted
during a scene is not appropriate during other interactions and that a fantasy role
is not the sum total of her being." 12 5 The participants are enhancing their sexual
pleasure, not damaging or imprisoning one another.
Pat Califia makes the following observations:
Some feminists object to the description of S/M as consensual. They believe
that our society has conditioned all of us to accept the inequities in power and
hierarchical relationships. Therefore, S/M is simply a manifestation of the same
of the partial or total removal of the clitoris together with the adjacent tissues of the labia
minora.... The final and most severe operation, called infibulation, involves removing the
clitoris, labia minora, and all or most of the labia majora. After the operation, the two sides
of the vulva are sutured together with catgut or thorns, leaving a tiny opening about the size
of a matchstick or fingertip for the passage of menstrual blood and urine. All three operations
may be performed with knives, razor blades, or pieces of glass .... In addition, all three
operations are usually performed without the use of anesthetics.
Id. at 2450-51 (citations omitted). Female circumcision is an intentional act utilized to prevent women
from engaging in pleasurable intercourse. See id. at 2481. This means that men understand the
pleasurable nature of the clitoris to women but believe that the pleasurable nature of the clitoris is meant
to benefit men rather than women, or so men think.
123. See PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX 167-68 (1994).
124. See id. But see Regina v. Brown, 1 App. Cas. 212 (H.L. 1993). In Regina, appellants, a group
of sadomasochists, pled guilty to charges of various offenses relating to the infliction of wounds or
actual bodily harm on genital and other areas of the body of the consenting victim. See id. at 230.
Appellants participated in violent acts intended to yield sexual pleasure by giving and receiving pain.
See id. at 231. They were found guilty of violating the Offenses Against The Person Act 1861, sections
20 and 47. See id. at 229. Appellants were guilty of some of the offenses in section 20 and of all the
offenses in section 47. See id. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeal as did
the House of Lords by a divided 3-2 panel. See id. at 216. Although all parties consented to the
sadomasochists' acts, the court criminally penalized them on the theory that sadomasochistic encounters
involve the indulgence of cruelty by sadists and the degradation of victims. Seeid. at229. Lord Mustill
recognized the medical risk of harm to the parties: "(Slome of the practices obviously created a risk of
genito-urinary infection, and others of septicaemia. These might have been grave in former times, but
the risk of serious harm must surely have been greatly reduced by modem medical science." See id. at
274. Lord Mustill stated that the parties consented to the acts and, moreover, he found it disfavorable
to punish them for consensual conduct "even if the extreme consequences do not ensue, just because
they might have done so, would require an assessment of the degree of risk, and the balancing of this
risk against the interests of individual freedom." See id.
125. CALIFIA, supra note 123, at 168.
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system that dresses girls in pink and boys in blue; allows surplus value to
accumulate in the coffers of capitalists while giving workers a minimum wage; and
sends out cops and soldiers to keep down the disenfranchised.126
Moreover, according to Califia, " [tihe issue of pain is probably as difficult for
non-S/M people to understand as polarized roles are. We tend to associate pain
with illness or self-destruction."'1 7 In contrast to the misconception non-S/M
people have about S/M, S/M does not necessarily involve pain; rather, S/M is
associated with "intense sensation, punishment or discipline."'28 Furthermore,
more essential to S/M than pain is the exchange of power.129 In any event, "pain
is a subjective experience."' 3 ° Califia further asserts that "[d]epending on the
context, a certain sensation may frighten you, make you angry, urge you on, or get
you hot. In many situations, people choose to endure pain or discomfort if the goal
for which they are striving makes it worthwhile."'' The derivative of women's
behavior can be from a variety of sources, including culture or dominant,
traditional views of society toward the roles associated with women. When
legislating punishment for conduct associated with the choices women make, it is
problematic to regard women's sexual activity as negative when the very same
behavior for men is not regarded as negative. The legal system seems incapable
of using the same reasoning and compassion applied to nonsexual issues when
formulating a position on sexual issues.1
31
If there were equality between the sexes, then "women would not be sexually
subjected."'33 "Rape ... would be recognized as [a] violation .... , Although
126. Id. at 169.
127. Id. at 170; see also PAULAJ. CAPLAN, THEMYTH OFWOMEN'S MASOCHISM 1-2 (1985). Paula
Caplan defines masochism as the following:
[Tihe need to derive pleasure from pain .... [it] is defined first as sexual masochism-"the
condition in which sexual gratification depends on suffering, physical pain, and
humiliation"-and second as "gratification gained from pain, deprivation ... inflicted or
imposed on oneself, either as a result of one's own actions or the actions of others ......
Id. Caplan also asserts that "women's behavior is used as evidence of our innate masochism, our
sickness, while men's similar behavior is used as evidence that they are real men .... The belief that
females seek out pain and suffering, that we have an innate need for misery, poisons every aspect of
women's lives." Id. at 2.




132. See id. at 171-72. Califia also notes that "[sladomasochism is also accused of being a hostile
or angry kind of sex, as opposed to the gentle and loving kind of sex that feminists should strive for.
The women's movement has become increasingly pro-romantic love in the last decade." Id. at 172.
133. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 215.
134. Id.
rape is a violation, one author seems to suggest that this is only the case if it is real
rape. 5 Rape, as defined by women, might be very different than man's definition.
Women might define rape as entering that sphere of pleasure that is most sacred.
That sphere would include the clitoris. Today, entering the sphere of the clitoris
is, if anything, short of rape. If there is a violation of the clitoris, it is generally an
offensive touching, but it is not rape. This violation would warrant punishment of
a lesser offense of rape, but not the felony of rape. This is the case even though
there was a body invasion of a substantial privacy interest. There are concerns that
if the body invasion is not deemed to be significant or continues to be
misunderstood by males, then it will be trivialized and not viewed as an offense in
need of grave punishment.
Feminists who aspire to the sameness and difference models believe that in
order for women to have access to equality principles, they need to be viewed in
the same light as men, while those aspiring to the difference model believe that
women are different from men and that difference should be celebrated. 36 "The
135. What is also problematic is the misconception of the rape fantasy. Rape fantasies have been
deemed masochistic desires:
What are called rape fantasies usually consist primarily of one of three elements, or of some
combination of the three:
(1) The wish that some man will find you so devastatingly desirable that he cannot control his
aroused sexuality;
(2) The wish to be able to trust someone so completely that you could feel that you could put
yourself completely in his hands, sexually; and
(3) The wish to have the man make all the sexual advances, so that you would not have to risk
appearing "too" sexual and, therefore, "unfeminine" in the traditional sense.
None of these is masochistic. The first is about being desired .... The second element... is
about being able to focus completely on one's own sexual enjoyment [and t]he third [is] a
phenomenon... [of] women's need to be sexually "swept away."
See CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 155. Equating women's sexual explorations, or erotica, as a desire to
suffer is a barrier to women seeking out their own sexuality and an impediment to their protection. This
is especially true when erotica is viewed as equivalent to asking for pain and, therefore, desiring to be
raped. Desiring to be raped is problematic in and of itself because rape is a crime, and one cannot
consent to a crime.
136. See Wendy Williams, The Equality of Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175,196 (1982) ("[Tjhe equality approach is the better [approach].
The special treatment model has great costs."); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 25
(1982). But see Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,963 (1984).
In her book, In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan relates an experiment to support the contention that
women simply speak in a different voice than men, that is, women think in terms of relationship, while
men think in terms of hierarchy. See GILLIGAN, supra, at 25-32. In the experiment, Amy and Jake, two
young children of the same age, were asked to respond to a hypothetical. See id. The hypothetical
presented a situation in which a man named Heinz did not have the money to purchase a drug for his
ill wife. See id. The children were asked whether Heinz should steal the drug. See id. Jake said Heinz
should steal the drug because Heinz's wife was more important than the issue of stealing. See id. Amy
said she did not think so. See id. Amy was concerned that Heinz would be imprisoned and that his wife
would have no one to take care of her. See id. Amy was also concerned about whether the drug would
be effective. See id. The interviewers claimed that Jake answered the question, but Amy did not. See
id. Gilligan, however, asserts that Amy answered the question, but she answered in a different voice.
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moral thrust of the sameness branch of the doctrine [is that it] conforms normative
rules to empirical reality by granting women access to what men have: to the extent
women are no different from men, women deserve what men have.''
37
Furthermore, "[tihe differences branch, which is generally regarded as patronizing
and unprincipled but necessary to avoid absurdity, exists to value or compensate
women for what they are or have become distinctively as women-by which is
meant, unlike men, or to leave women as 'different' as equality law finds them.''
138
To define the reality of gender as difference and the warrant of equality as sameness
not only guarantees that sex equality will never be achieved; it is wrong on both
counts. Sex in nature is not a bipolarity, it is a continuum; society makes it into a
bipolarity. Once this is done, to require that one be the same as those who set the
standard-those from whom one is already socially defined as different-simply means
that sex equality is conceptually designed in law never to be achieved. 3 9
Following this logic lends itself to problems with rape, specifically, how terms
are defined and how laws are made. If rape is defined in male terms and laws are
determined by male standards, then the violation of a woman's body can only be
understood to the extent that a male can relate. The violation, then, is only relevant
as understood by male conduct. This is the same problem articulated by Catherine
MacKinnon in her discussion on pornography: pornography defines what a woman
is through conditioning the male sexual response to that definition. 40 By not
allowing a woman's perspective, these standards permit men to decide what is
violative of a woman's body.
The two rape cases involving William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson
See id.
In contrast to Gilligan's different voice theory and Wendy Williams' understanding of the equality
approach, Sylvia Law notes the following:
A constitutional theory based on either the assimilationist vision or the respect-for-difference
vision presumes that it is possible to answer the question, "Are men and women essentially
similar?," with a simple yes or no. The assimilationist principle answers the question "yes"
and condemns laws that treat people differently. The respect-for-difference principle
emphasizes that, at least under present social conditions, the situations of men and women are
not essentially similar, and it would evaluate laws affecting men and women differently by
asking whether they empower and respect women.... A third vision ... assumes that it is not
possible to give a single answer to the question whether men and women are essentially
similar. We know that there are biological differences between men and women in relation
to reproduction.
See Law, supra, at 968-69.
137. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 220.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 233.
140. See id. at 197-99.
marginalized a woman's perspective on rape. The cases focused on penetration
and consent or the lack thereof, and there simply was a presumption that they had
the right to touch and fondle until the men understood, undoubtedly, that they were
to stop. These cases illustrate the difficulty for women who are raped. The two
cases underscore the significant "problems associated with prosecuting nonstranger
rape."'' . In the 1991 Smith case, the rape victim's credibility was found to be
adversely affected because she met Smith over drinks in a bar and because she
offered Smith a ride home.'42 The consent and credibility issues were also points
raised by the defense counsel in Tyson v. State.143 Therefore, in both the Smith and
Tyson cases there was a presumption that the woman agreed to sexual intercourse
because they rode in the same car or limo with the defendants. These cases
demonstrate that women's bodies are for men to invade, unless and until the
woman gets the point across to the hot and heavy man that she wants him to stop.
The woman must show that she has done so by clear and convincing evidence.
The woman's body, even her most private spheres, can be invaded, unless she
unequivocally gets the point across to the man that she objects.
m]I. REDEFINING RAPE
Each year in the United States, approximately 500,000 women report rapes
and sexual assaults." One of every two women will be a rape victim.' Although
there is sufficient data to indicate that women are targeted by virtue of their
gender, 46 the focus of new laws is gender neutrality. Kathleen Barry defined
crimes against women as the following:
[T]hose acts of violence which are directed at women because of their female sexual
definition. In committing a crime against a woman, sexual satisfaction, usually in the
form of orgasm, is one of the intended outcomes of sexual violence for the aggressor
who unites sex and violence to subdue, humiliate, degrade, and terrorize his female
victim."'
Even though this is the focus, women still live with the constant threat of becoming
141. See Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Baptist Is Not a Stranger: Suggested Reform
to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 169, 185 (1994).
142. See David Margolick, Credibility Seen as Crux of Celebrated Rape Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1991, at 24L.
143. 619 N.E.2d 276, 285-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
144. See RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ-154348, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY:
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 1 (1992).
145. See DIANA E.H. RUSSEL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 35 (1984).
146. See id.; see also Kathleen Barry, Social Etiology of Crimes Against Women, 10 VICTIMOLOGY
164-73 (1985).
147. Barry, supra note 146, at 164.
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a victim.'48  This everyday living as a potential victim was deemed sexual
terrorism:
Sexual terrorism is the system by which males frighten, and by frightening, dominate
and control females. It is manifested through actual and implied violence. All
females are potential victims-at any age, any time, or any place, and through a
variety of means: rape, battery, incest, sexual abuse of children, sexual harassment,
prostitution, and sexual slavery. The subordination of women in all other spheres of
the society rests on the power of men to intimidate and to punish women sexually. 49
I proposed the question of redefining rape, from a woman's perspective, to my
Women and the Law seminar at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center. One definition from the students, which was comprised of fourteen
females and three males, was as follows:
Sexual battery means either the anal, clitoral, oral, penile, or vaginal intrusion by,
or the junction with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal, clitoral, penile, or
vaginal intrusion by any other object or body part. Intrusion means the act of
entering into the physical area intended for one's exclusive use and control in an
inappropriate and unwanted manner without invitation or permission. 50
148. See MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 1 (1989).
149. Carole J. Sheffield, Sexual Terrorism: The Social Control of Women, in ANALYZING GENDER
171, 171 (Myra Marx Ferree & Beth B. Hess eds., 1987).
150. This definition was created by my Spring 1996 Women and the Law class. Sexual battery is
the equivalent to rape. Although the term sexual battery was the term decided upon by the class, there
were students in the class who believed that the term "rape" should be the term used in the redefinition
because society understands the term to indicate extreme harshness of the offense. There were several
colleagues who attended a faculty colloquy at Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad Law Center where I
presented my ideas on the subject. The colleagues agreed with the students that the term "rape" should
be the term used by state legislatures for that same reason.
Another interesting note about the definition is that this was the definition presented by Paula Jones'
attorneys in the deposition of President Clinton concerning the President's alleged sexual conduct with
Monica Lewinsky. Jones' attorneys deposed the President with a question on whether the President had
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. See STARR REPORT, supra note 118, at 301. Sexual Relations, as
termed by Jones' attorneys, occurs when a "person knowingly engages in or causes.., contact with the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person .... 'Contact' means intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing." Id. (alterations in original). At least two issues arise here: (1) which jurisdiction should
provide the definition for the alleged sexual (mis)conduct, the District of Columbia or Arkansas?; and
(2) should the President be held to know and be accountable to the laws of all jurisdictions and, if so,
statutory law or judicial interpretations? With respect to the first question, one would assume that the
controlling law would have to be the District of Columbia, because if Jones' question was directed to
the President's (mis)conduct with Monica Lewinsky, that conduct occurred in the District of Columbia.
See id. at 302. What creates the dilemma is the fact that neither jurisdiction uses the term sexual
relations in their definitions. The District of Columbia provides that "sexual act" means, among other
things, "penetration. . . of the vulva.., by a penis [or clontact between the mouth and the penis, the
mouth and the vulva.., or [t]he penetration... of the ... vulva by a hand, finger or any object, with
an intent to... arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4101(8)(A)-
(D) (1997). The D.C. Code further provides that "'[slexual contact' means the touching with any
clothed or unclothed body part or any object, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks... with the intent to... arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person." Id. at § 22-4101(9). The term sexual conduct includes masturbation, sexual
intercourse, or "physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area... or if such
person be a female, breast." See id. at § 22-2001 (b)(2)(C). "'Sexual excitement' includes the condition
of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal." Id. at § 22-
2001(b)(2)(D). The alleged conduct raised by Ms. Lewinsky is termed sexual contact, sexual
excitement, and sexual act. The President fervently stated that he did not engage in sexual relations
with Ms. Lewinsky. See STARR REPORT, supra note 118, at 302. The problem is in determining what
constitutes sexual relations in the District of Columbia. The Starr Report indicates that the conduct
when the President, allegedly, placed his hands in Ms. Lewinsky's pants was "acts clearly within the
definition of 'sexual relations' used at the Jones deposition." See id. at 304. According to the statute,
this indicates a sexual act or sexual excitement. The President indicated to the public, without
explanation, that he engaged in "inappropriate conduct" with Ms. Lewinsky. It seems to me that
evidence was sufficient to show that at best there was sexual conduct because sperm was found on Ms.
Lewinsky's dress, and the President would have problems overcoming circumstantial evidence of
masturbation which is included in the statute. Even if the President argues that he did not engage in
sexual contact or excitement and that he did not have contact with Ms. Lewinsky's genitalia or breasts,
because of the sperm there is sufficient evidence to infer the occurrence of masturbation, which is
sufficient for sexual conduct. Jones could have used sexual conduct, as opposed to sexual relations, and
Judge Starr would have had a better argument on perjury. The section referencing to sexual conduct
probably was not used in Jones' deposition because it also includes the term sexual intercourse, a term
that was likely problematic because there was not sufficient evidence of vaginal penetration. What
Jones presented as definitive of sexual relations was more likely used because of the inability to raise
circumstantial evidence or any other evidence that would show vaginal penetration. Although Jones
could not show it, she probably believed that because of the wording of the statute her definition would
incorporate all the evidence raised in Ms. Lewinsky's allegations and circumstantial evidence that
would corroborate President Clinton's statements of inappropriate behavior. Another problem it seems
to me that developed from Jones' sexual relations definition was that President Clinton stated that his
understanding and the common understanding of the American people is that "sexual relations" means
conduct that leads up to sexual intercourse, meaning vaginal penetration, of which there is no evidence.
I believe the President is correct that the common understanding of sexual relations and sexual
intercourse means conduct that leads up to vaginal penetration. The definition presented by Jones and
proposed by this Article would include conduct that does not necessarily lead up to vaginal penetration.
The definition proposed by this Article better protects a woman's private sphere.
In Arkansas, "'sexual intercourse' means penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis
... and 'sexual contact' means any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through
clothing of the sex organs ... of a person or the breast of a female. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(8) to
(9) (Michie 1997). The statute was amended in 1995 and substituted "labia majora" for "vagina." See
id. at historical notes. Penetration within the labia, up to as far as the hymen, is sufficient for
penetration of the vagina. See Hice v. State, 593 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Ark. 1980). Masturbation,
however, is not sexual conduct. See Drymon v. State, 875 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Ark. 1994).
At the time this Article was accepted to publication with Pepperdine Law Review, I had no
knowledge of the alleged sexual (mis)conduct between President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky nor was
I privy to the contents of Paula Jones' deposition of the President concerning the conduct. What is
interesting is the definition of what constitutes sexual relations according to Paula Jones corresponds
to the definition proposed by this Article for redefining rape. Although the conduct between Ms.
Lewinsky and the President did not involve issues of rape, the sexual protective sphere of woman has
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Several other definitions included physical and manual manipulation of the sexual
organs of another, including the penis, anus, or vagina. A majority of the students
believed that it was very important for the statute to be gender neutral. It was quite
surprising, given the makeup of the class and the name of the class, that the
students would allow this gender neutral focus.
The proposed definition of rape would certainly allow women in same sex
relationships to be punished severely for an act which is now classified as a felony
when different sexes are involved; 5' however, the act by lesbians, today, is not
punished as Denise Snyder of the D.C. Rape Crisis Center reports the following:
"'So many women don't define what has happened to them as rape because we
have this stereotype of what rape is in our minds .... To admit to yourself that
what has happened is rape is an emotionally devastating experience."" 52 The same
stereotypes are even greater obstacles in instances of same sex rape. '53 Regarding
same sex rape, Snyder states that she "'literally had people ask me, "How can that
happen? What would constitute a sexual assault between two women?".... It's
tied to that whole stereotypical question, "What could Lesbians possibly do to have
sex?...54 Although Snyder seems concerned about rapes that occur between
lesbians, she too, focuses on penetration. At the 25th anniversary of the Center, it
was disclosed that the staff had reached their goal of redefining rape. In the new
celebrated definitions, "references to gender in the definition were removed, and
it was widened to define rape as forced penetration by any object, not just a
penis."'' Snyder stated that the new definition more accurately reflected reality
"since rape does not necessarily have to involve a penis, and the perpetrator and
victim are not always male and female."' 56 Women, she states, can be perpetrators
too;157 but Snyder, like most of society, equates women to men. The problem is
that women can be invaded without being penetrated. I was surprised that, unlike
my students, Snyder did not consider that some same-sex couples do not penetrate
during a sex act, and the forced intrusion in that sphere is as severe as if there had
been penetration, by any object, to an individual who allows penetration.
to be included in such a discussion. Ms. Jones presented, at best, what might constitute sexual relations,
but this was not the definition used in the District of Columbia at the time the President was deposed.
151. See supra notes 8, 61 & 66.
152. SeeWendy Johnson, Battling Misconceptions About Rape for 25 Years: D.C. Rape Crisis
Center Marks Anniversary, WASH. BLADE, May 16, 1997, at 12 (quoting Denise Snyder, Executive
Director, Washington D.C. Rape Crisis Center).
153. See id.




In a March 17, 1998 telephone interview with Denise Snyder,.I questioned her
about this aspect of rape.158 She stated that at the time the Center was seeking a
new definition for the crime of rape, the focus was on widening the definition to
define rape as forced penetration by any object, not just a penis. '59 She stated that
I was "taking it a step further.'' She also relayed an analogy regarding her life
in the urban Washington D.C. area that she uses when instructing on violent sex
crimes.' 16 She stated that she did not realize the severity of the smog, pollution,
and other conditions in D.C. until she returned to her small, rural, hometown in
Virginia.162 Once arriving at home, she admonishes that this is how the air is
supposed to be: clear, clean, crisp, fresh, and breathable. 163 She then stated that
one forgets how it should be when one is so used to how it is.' 64 Nonetheless, both
spheres are sacred to women, and the unwelcomed invasion should be punished
equally.
Even if we accept the equality principle, which is the gender-neutral approach,
why is it that we cannot do the following:
[I]nsist that the equality theory requires that we reorganize our understanding of
sexual crime, that unwanted sexual intrusion of types other than male-female sexual
intercourse can similarly violate and humiliate the victim, and that legislation which
defines sexual offenses in gender neutral terms, because it resists our segregationist
urges and affirms our common humanity... ?65
Or should we simply do the following:
[D]efend traditional rape laws on the ground that rape, defined by law as penetration
by the penis of the vagina, is a sexual offense the psychological and social
consequences of which are so unique, severe, and rooted in age-old power
relationships between the sexes that a gender-neutral law would fail in important
ways to deal with the world as it really is?' 66
Even though men are more commonly the aggressors in sex acts,'67 "females
account for a small percentage of known offenders, [and] in a very small fraction
of sexual assaults, victim and offender are of the same sex.'
68
158. Telephone Interview with Denise Snyder, Executive Director, Washington D.C. Rape Crisis
Center (Mar. 17, 1998).
159. See id.





165. See Williams, supra note 136, at 187.
166. See id.
167. See GREENFIELD, supra note 3, at iii-iv (stating that "99 in 100 [rapists] are male").
168. Id. at iii.
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Women can be perpetrators of sexual violence, too .... It does happen, but I
would not be surprised if people aren't aware of it. There is discomfort when
accepting the fact that women can be sexually violent. And when homophobia is
heaped on top of all the victim-blaming and silencing that happens around sexual
assault, it creates such denial."'69
Snyder also added that in lesbian relationships, rape assaults may not happen as
frequently because the relationship between two women has a different social
dynamic than the relationship between a man and a woman." 0 The sphere is being
protected, not the gendered person.' In protecting this sphere, it is not an issue
of being against men, but rather, a need to be for women.
IV. CONCLUSION
The punishment for rape at one time was death. Rape is one of the felonies
included in the felony murder rule. Only inherently dangerous felonies are
included in the felony murder rule. A perpetrator may get life imprisonment for
felony murder. Rape obviously is a very serious crime with severe trauma to the
victim. The victims of rape are generally women. The crime of rape punishes
victimizers for entering into an individual's most private sphere. Laws punish
individuals for that invasion. Entering a woman's most private sphere does not
have to include male type conduct in order for the invasion to be severely punished
by law. Unlike men, women have at least two most private spheres-the clitoris and
the vagina. The clitoris and the vagina are both female sex organs. The
punishment for the invasion of either of those most private spheres should be
identical.
The private sphere for women should be defined in women's terms and from
a woman's perspective; otherwise, rape will continue to be a crime of violence on
women by men, as defined by men. This practice permits men to continue, as they
have from the beginning of American history, to treat women as property. This
affords men the right to touch a woman's body, even her treasures, until she resists
to the point that he understands that she is resisting. As we approach the
millennium, it is time for women to say "no." A woman's body is not the property
of a man, and he is not entitled to touch, unless he gets permission. There is no
right for anyone to invade a woman's most private sphere. The severity of the
169. Johnson, supra note 152, at 12 (quoting Denise Snyder).
170. See id.
171. See id.
punishment is generally related to the invasion. The severity of the invasion of a
woman's body ought to be defined from a woman's perspective of intrusiveness.
Rape. is the invasion of the female sex organs by a male. Including the clitoris as
a female sex organ in the definition of rape reflects the woman's perspective of
intrusiveness. Consequently, because the clitoris, like the vagina, is a sex organ
in which the nonconsensual invasion is so intrusive, the invasion of it, like that of
the vagina, is rape.
